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Security

Tampered Claude Code extension in Cursor planted a back door on laptops

For eleven hours, Cursor’s marketplace offered an infected version of the Claude Code extension. Anyone who loaded it got a back door that stays after uninstalling.

For eleven hours, the extension marketplace of the coding tool Cursor offered an infected version of Anthropic’s Claude Code extension. Anyone who loaded it got a back door that let an attacker log in remotely, and that stayed put after uninstalling.

It was version 2.1.313 of the extension developers use to run the AI coding assistant Claude Code inside their editor. According to Cursor, it was in its marketplace on Thursday 29 October from 09:27 to 20:35 UTC, in the builds for Apple-silicon Macs and for Windows. Cursor estimates that up to 5,000 users were affected and says Anthropic did not make this version. It pulled the version, took its marketplace offline for a while and had the attacker’s server taken down. A clean version, 2.1.314, appeared overnight.

The malicious code sat in a single file and ran as soon as the editor loaded the extension, without anyone clicking anything. It added the attacker’s SSH key, labelled svc-telemetry, to the keys allowed to log in to the computer; SSH is the usual way to operate a computer remotely. It then tried to switch SSH on and open a tunnel to a server at 134.209.82.225, letting the attacker in past the firewall. Through startup entries, that tunnel came back after every restart, on macOS, Linux and Windows, and the attacker received details of the computer. According to Cursor, bugs in the code meant switching SSH on usually failed without administrator rights; the key and the startup entries went in regardless.

Sources contradict each other on how far it reached. Cursor has no evidence that the official channels were affected, and OpenSourceMalware found the versions on Open VSX and in Microsoft’s marketplace clean. According to Security.NL, the researcher Kevin Beaumont says Microsoft’s marketplace was hit too and that Anthropic had not yet warned customers. People who say they work at Anthropic wrote on the tech forum Hacker News that 2.1.313 never appeared on Open VSX, in Microsoft’s marketplace or through Anthropic’s own channels. We found no official statement from Anthropic on Friday.

Uninstalling the extension alone won’t remove the backdoor.

The security firm Phorion on version 2.1.313, 30 October 2026

Where Cursor gets its extensions

Cursor is a fork of Visual Studio Code, Microsoft’s free editor: its own version of the same open-source code. Extensions for VS Code normally come from Microsoft’s marketplace, but that is meant only for Microsoft’s own products. Forks such as Cursor and Windsurf therefore use Open VSX, a public registry of extensions run by the Eclipse Foundation. According to StepSecurity, Cursor mirrors it in a marketplace of its own; that is where the infected version sat.

An extension runs unshielded, with your colleague’s rights: whatever they can read on their laptop, it can read too.

Earlier attacks through the editor

In July 2025, according to Kaspersky, a blockchain developer lost some $500,000 in crypto through a fake extension from Open VSX. The attacker had inflated its download count to 54,000, so the fake ranked above the real one in search results.

In May, an infected version of the popular Nx Console extension sat in Microsoft’s marketplace for eleven minutes. According to StepSecurity, it went looking for keys to GitHub, npm, AWS and 1Password, and for Claude Code’s settings. A day later GitHub reported that some 3,800 internal code repositories had been taken through an employee’s laptop, infected by a VS Code extension. It did not say which one.

Why a developer’s laptop in particular

A great deal comes together on a developer’s laptop: keys to servers, access to GitHub and the cloud, and more and more often keys for AI services. They often sit ready in environment variables: settings any program on the laptop can read. That is where the infected extension looked: it sent along the names of up to 40 variables containing words such as KEY, TOKEN, SECRET or AWS. Not the values, but it showed the attacker which laptops were worth the effort.

Such an extra key is easy to miss; according to Phorion, a login through the tunnel appears to come from the computer itself. Cursor and the researchers therefore advise: remove the key, startup entries and tunnel, use a clean computer to replace everything the laptop could reach, and consider a fresh install.

Our analysis

An extension gets all of your colleague’s access, but rarely the same scrutiny

What makes this attack dangerous is that everything was right except one file. The name was Anthropic’s, the rest of the extension was genuine. Between Anthropic and your colleague’s laptop sat a marketplace nobody in your organisation consciously chose; it comes with the editor. Headlines saying Anthropic was hacked are getting ahead of the facts. Our expectation: as long as it is unclear how the version got there, every step between maker and laptop is a place where things can go wrong.

That the damage looks limited is mostly luck. Because of bugs in the code, the door often did not open. But the key and the startup entries went in, and the attacker got a list of laptops holding cloud keys. If those keys stay on a laptop for a long time and with broad rights, one infected extension is a way into the servers, the code and the customer data.

So the lesson is not to ban extensions. Know which ones run and which marketplace they come from, update them at a moment you choose, and keep long-lived keys off laptops as far as you can. A key that expires after an hour, or only reaches one project, is worth far less to a thief.

What stands out

  • Loading was enough The code ran as soon as the editor loaded the extension. Using Claude Code was not even necessary.
  • A bug in the malware helped On the Mac, the code took an error about missing permissions as a sign that SSH was already on. The key and the startup entries still went in.
  • How it got there is unknown Nobody has yet explained who was able to put the version in the marketplace. Without that answer, there is no telling whether it can happen again.

What it means for you

If your colleagues use Cursor or another editor with extensions, a marketplace has a say in what runs on their laptops.

  • Check whether you were hit Search laptops for version 2.1.313 of the Claude Code extension and for an SSH key labelled svc-telemetry. If you find either, take the laptop off the network.
  • Replace what the laptop could reach If a laptop was infected, use a clean computer to replace the keys, passwords and sessions it could reach: GitHub, the cloud and AI services.
  • Decide which extensions are allowed With a short list of permitted extensions, and knowing which marketplace they come from, it is quickly clear who could be affected when a notice like this lands.

Where we come in · Support

We keep an eye on what your colleagues build

With Support, a dedicated team of senior developers keeps watch over what your colleagues build with AI: we guard against keys in the code and vulnerable libraries, and keep track of who can reach what. When a notice like this lands, you quickly see who could be affected and what needs replacing. And we set up a shielded development environment in which AI tools can only reach the project, not the rest of the laptop.

Do you know which extensions your colleagues use, and where they come from?

Tell us which tools your colleagues build with. We’ll think it through with you and always reply within one working day.

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