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Going online through the White House: the quiet trade in home connections

For a month, the traffic of anyone with a proxy subscription could come out at the White House. The same week, Google shut down a botnet of 1.3 million devices with a backdoor built in at the factory.

Over the past month, anyone who bought an ordinary proxy service could find their internet traffic coming out on the White House network. And in the same week Google shut down a botnet of 1.3 million TV boxes and other devices, with a backdoor that according to Google the manufacturer had built in itself.

Layer3 Intel, a company that maps proxy services, found it by chance. It bought ordinary access to residential proxies, services that route your traffic through a household’s connection, and saw traffic exit on the network of the Executive Office of the President, the agency that hosts the White House network. From 5 October to 3 November it counted 236 exits through six addresses, on 26 of 30 days, sold by 28 different proxy services. About half fell between 5 pm and midnight, Washington time. Layer3 says that fits someone on that network in the evening better than a guest network, though it stresses it sees only the exits, not the device or the person.

The research firm Synthient linked the traffic to Windows computers that are probably running Infatica, proxy software that rides along in “free” apps. According to Krebs on Security, Infatica’s founder previously ran a hosting firm, King Servers, which hosted six of the eight internet addresses that Russian state security services used in 2016 to break into election-system databases in Arizona and Illinois. Some resellers offer such bandwidth from 60 cents a gigabyte. The White House did not respond to questions; the US State Department asked Layer3 for its logs.

On 2 November Google announced that it had dismantled the XCPE botnet with partners including Japan’s National Police Agency. Google concludes with high confidence that the Chinese manufacturer Videostrong built the backdoor itself into the software of more than 1.3 million devices in over 200 countries: mostly Android TV boxes, but also telehealth devices, karaoke machines and digital signage. Remove it and it comes back at the next restart. According to Google, access was sold to criminals for ad fraud, proxy networks and more malware. Videostrong is barred from making certified Android devices and did not respond to questions from The Record.

For less than a dollar you can gain access into some of the most confidential and trusted networks.

Ben Brundage of Synthient to Krebs on Security, 4 November 2026

How a home connection comes up for sale

A residential proxy lets you browse through someone else’s connection, so it looks as if you are simply at home. Those connections come mostly from SDKs: ready-made pieces of code that app makers build into their apps. According to Google, proxy companies pay app makers for this, usually per download. The device does what the app promises, and rents out the connection on the side.

Some people join knowingly, paid for their “unused bandwidth”. Others have no idea, or bought a device that came with it.

Why criminals want a home connection

Through a home connection, malicious traffic draws less attention. In March the FBI warned that such networks are used to disguise phishing, spam and the servers that control malware. In a single week in January Google saw more than 550 threat groups working through one proxy network, including groups from China, North Korea, Iran and Russia, for password attacks and break-ins into cloud services.

The best-known example is 911 S5, which the US Justice Department took down in 2024: millions of Windows computers with more than 19 million addresses, recruited through free VPN apps. Its administrator made some $99 million from it, and customers used it to file, among other things, 560,000 fraudulent unemployment claims.

From cheap box to certified device

Android TV boxes have been a source for years. BadBox 2.0, according to Google, involved more than 10 million uncertified devices in 2025. Early this year Krebs on Security described the Kimwolf botnet of more than 2 million devices: attackers went through a proxy network into the home networks behind the proxies, and found TV boxes there that let anyone in without a password.

XCPE is different because it was also in certified devices. The software got through Google’s tests by disguising its code and loading only after the first start-up. Spur showed early this year that business networks are affected too: it found proxies on nearly 300 government networks and at 166 healthcare organisations.

Our analysis

Your internet address is an identity, and someone else can rent it

Nothing known so far points to a break-in at the White House itself. Synthient saw software that rents out bandwidth, probably installed along with a free app. That can happen in any organisation where people bring their own devices or install software themselves. What gets less attention in the coverage is what your address then becomes: someone else’s disguise. If a password attack runs through your connection, you can end up on blocklists, and investigators trace it back to you.

The bigger risk runs the other way. An exit can also be an entrance: with Kimwolf, attackers reached the network behind a proxy, and Layer3 warns of exactly that. That is why, for organisations, XCPE weighs more than the White House story. A certificate says a device passed the tests, not what it fetches afterwards. And the screen in the meeting room often sits on the same network as the laptops.

The lesson is not spectacular: put devices you do not manage yourself on a network of their own, and look at what is talking to the outside. Our expectation: now that firms such as Layer3 and Spur map proxy exits network by network, more organisations will hear about it from outside before they see it themselves.

What stands out

  • The timing gives a person away About half of the exits fell between 5 pm and midnight. According to Layer3, that fits someone using the network in the evening, not a guest network.
  • The same addresses, at 28 sellers Proxy companies share their supply with resellers. Shut off the source in a network, and it disappears from all those services at once.
  • Certified was no guarantee The XCPE backdoor got through Google’s tests by disguising its code and loading only after the first start-up. Google is now changing its checks.
  • The traffic stopped after publication The White House said nothing, but according to The Register the last traffic came hours after Layer3 put its findings online. Then it stopped.

What it means for you

A device that quietly rents out your connection turns your address into someone else’s disguise, and can be a way in.

  • Keep what you do not manage apart Screens, TV boxes, guest devices and laptops people bring in belong on a network of their own, separate from the systems that hold customer and company data.
  • Look at what talks to the outside Software that rents out bandwidth talks to fixed servers run by proxy companies. That traffic can be recognised, if someone looks for it.
  • No apps that share your connection An app that offers money or free use in exchange for your “unused bandwidth” does not belong on a work computer or phone.

Where we come in · Support

We check what your own tools pull in

Proxy software travels inside ready-made pieces of code that app makers build into their apps. With Support, senior developers keep an eye on what your colleagues build with AI: which packages they use, which services their tools talk to and which of those are vulnerable. That way you know what your own tools are doing.

Do you know which devices are on your network, and who they talk to?

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